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Recent Developments
Under Article 9 Of The
Uniform Commercial Code
By DEAN ROY L. STEINHEIMER, JR.
A review of the recent decisions
under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code reveals little of startling
significance. The mainstream of
these decisions does, however, evi-
dence a gratifying comprehension by
our courts of the purposes which
were intended to be served by the




Earlier uncertainties as to the
status under Article 9 of a surety on
a construction contractor's bond seem
now to be well on the way to satis-
factory resolution. The argument
that a perfoming surety's rights to
subrogation are "security interests"
under Article 9 which require filing
for protection has now been rejected
by a number of courts', including the
Kansas Supreme Court.2
The distinction between "pure"
leases which are not subject to Article
9 and leases which are "intended as
security," and require perfection
under Article 9, continues to cause
difficulty largely because the distinc-
tion between the two turns on the
facts of each case. The inclusion of
an option to purchase in the lease
agreement does not, of itself, make
1 National Shawmut Bank v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
1969) ; In re J. V. Gleason Co., Inc., 9
UCC Rep. Serv. 1317 (8th Cir. 1971).
2 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. First
State Bank of Salina, 10 UCC Rep. Serv.
682 (1972).
the lease one which is "intended as
security" under Article 9. But if the
option to purchase can be exercised
for no consideration or for a nominal
consideration the lease is one "in-
tended as security." The fact that
the lease -agreement does not include
an express option to purchase will
not prevent a court from finding on
appropriate facts that the lease was
nevertheless "intended as security."
4
Ccnsignment arrangements seem
to be a recurrent source of difficulty
under the Code. The difficulty appar-
ently stems from the fact that persons
using this type of arrangement do
not appreciate the fact that even
though a consignment arrangement
may not be one "intended as security"
under Article 9, the Code nevertheless
requires that creditors of the con-
signee have notice of the existence
of the consignment arrangement as
provided in Section 2-326(3) if the
consignor is to prevail against such
creditors.2 Because of the Code's
treatment of consignment arrange-
ments which are not "intended as
security," if the consignee returns
consigned goods to the consignor
within four months of the consignee"s
bankruptcy, there is the danger that
3 James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin National
Bank, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 11 (Minn.
1972) ; Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards
Aircraft Co., 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 491
(WD Okla. 1972).
4In re Brothers Coach Corp., 9 UCC Rep.
Serv. 502 (ED N.Y. 1971).
Modular Housing, Inc. v. GAC Trans-
World Acceptance Corp., 10 UCC Rep.
Serv. 125 (Ala. 1972).
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a voidable preference may be involved
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act unless the notice requirements of
the Code have been satisfied.6
Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v.
Penning's Sales, Inc.7 presents an
interesting set of facts which suggest
two problems with the Code's con-
signment provisions. One problem
involves the consignor's dilemma if
he wants to give notice of a consign-
ment arrangement which is not
"intended as security" under Article
9. In many states the only feasible
method of giving such notice will be
through the filing of a financing
statement. But if the consignor files
a financing statement, what assur-
ance does he have that his act of
filing the financing statement will
not be regarded as an admission that
his consignment arrangement is really
"intended as security" and is a
secured transaction under Article 9?
After the Final Report of the Review
Committee for Article 9 was pub-
lished in April, 1971, this problem
was considered by the Committee and
it has been suggested that a new
section be added to Article 9 which
would read as follows:
"SECTION 9-408. Financing State-
ments Covering Consigned or
Leased Goods.
"A consignor or lessor of goods
may file a financing statement
using the terms 'consignor,' 'con-
signee,' 'lessor,' 'lessee' or the like
instead of the terms specified in
Section 9-402. The provisions of
this part shall apply as appropriate
to such a financing statement but
its filing shall not of itself be a
factor in determining whether or
not the consignment or lease is
6 In re Gross Mfg. & Importing Co., Inc.,
9 UCC Rep. Serv. 355 (D N.J. 1971).
7 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 797 (Wash. 1971).
intended as security [Section 1-201
(37) ]. However, if it is determined
for other reasons that the consign-
ment or lease is so intended, a
security interest of the consignor
or lessor which attaches to the
consigned or leased goods is per-
fected by such filing."
This provision will be helpful not
only to the consignor of goods but
also to the lessor of goods who intends
to create a "pure" lease which does
not require filing but who is always
fearful of the possibility that the
lease may be found to be "intended
as security" and subject to Article 9.
The other problem suggested by the
Manufacturers Acceptance case in-
volves the possible conflict between
a secured party who has a perfected
security interest in a debtor's inven-
tory and a consignor who delivers
inventory to the debtor "on consign-
ment" and who gives notice of the
consignment, arrangement by filing a
financing statement. As the Code
now stands, the consignor in this
situation would prevail over the
inventory secured party despite the
fact that the inventory secured party
may have had no actual knowledge of
the fact that his inventory security
was threatened by the delivery of
goods into debtor's inventory "on
consignment,"
The problem is closely akin to that
of the inventory lender who may be
threatened by a competing purchase
money security interest in the same
inventory. Section 9-312(3) provides
some protection to the inventory
lender in the purchase money situa-
tion but there is no similar protection
provided in the consignment situation.
Under the recommendations of the
Review Committee for Article 9, this
gap in the Code would be filled by
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the addition of a new section which
reads as follows:
"SECTION 9-114. Consignment
(1) A person who delivers goods
under a consignment which is not
a security interest and who would
be required to file under this
Article by paragraph (3) (c) of
Section 2-326 has priority over a
secured party who is or becomes
a creditor of the consignee and
who would have a perfected secur-
ity interest in the goods if they
were the property of the consignee,
and also has priority with respect
to identifiable cash proceeds re-
ceived on or before delivery of the
goods to a buyer, if
(a) the consignor complies with
the filing provision of the Article
on Sales with respect to consign-
ments [paragraph (3) (c) of
Section 2-326] before the debtor
receives possession of the goods;
and
(b) the consignor gives notifi-
cation in writing to the holder
of the security interest if the
holder has filed a financing
statement covering the same
types of goods before the date
of the filing made by the con-
signor; and
(c) the holder of the security
interest receives the notification
within five years before the
debtor receives possession of the
goods; and
(d) the notification states that
the consignor expects to deliver
goods on consignment to the
debtor, describing the goods by
item or type.
(2) In the case of a consignment
which is not a security interest and
in which the requirements of the
preceding sub-section have not
been met, a person who delivers
goods to another is subordinate to
a person who would have a per-
fected security interest in the
goods if they were the property of
the debtor."
CONFLICT OF LAWS
When a security interest in a motor
vehicle is perfected by notation of the
lien on a certificate of title in State A
and then the vehicle is removed to
State B where notation is also the
accepted method of perfection, the
perfection in State A continues effec-
tive in State B until a new certificate
of title is issued in State B.8 If a
security interest in a motor vehicle is
properly perfected in State A, a non-
title certificate state, by filing a
financing statement and then the
vehicle is removed to State B which
is a title certificate state, under
section 9-103(3), the perfection in
State A remains effective in State B
for four months.! With this in mind,
suppose that during the four month
period State B issues a clean certifi-
cate of title on the vehicle which is
then sold within the four month
period to a bona fide purchaser for
value. As the Code stands, the secur-
ity interest perfected by filing in
State A should prevail against the
bona fide purchaser. However, one
might well question the fairness of
such a result as did the Texas
Supreme Court in Phil Phillips Ford,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co.0 Indeed, the Review Com-
s In re Wolf, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 177 (WD,
Mich. 1971) ; Town House Motel, Inc. v.
Ward, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 267 (Ill. App.
1971).
Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 288 P.2d 879 (Colo.
1971).
10 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1331 (1971).
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mittee for Article 9 seems to be
equally unhappy with the result the
Code seems to call for and has recom-
mended that a non-dealer buyer of
the vehicle should be protected in this
situation."
11 See Final Report, §9-103(2) (d).
SECURITY AGREEMENT AND
FINANCING STATEMENT
While a financing statement in the
usual form will not satisfy the re-
quirements of a written security
agreement necessary to the creation
of an enforceable security interest,
several recent decisions indicate that
our courts will strive to find a suffi-
cient writing if at all possible. In
Evans v. Everett,12 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court found a sufficient
written security agreement embodied
in a promissory note which recited
that it "is secured by Uniform Com-
mercial Code financing statement of
North Carolina" and a reciprocal
12 279 N.C. 352, 183 S.E.2d 109 (1971).
reference to the financing statement
that it covered certain described
collateral "same securing note for
advanced money to produce crops for
the year 1969." In re Carmichael
Enterprises, Inc."3 found a sufficient
written security agreement from the
fact that a letter from the lender to
the debtor recited the indebtedness
and requested debtor to sign an
enclosed financing statement and
these contemporaneously executed
documents were held to be a written
security agreement.
While the Code gives considerable
latitude on the matter of description
of the collateral in the security agree-
ment and in the financing statement,
the limits of tolerance of our courts
in this regard vary considerably. Two
recent decisions of the United States
District Court in Kansas are interest-
(Continued on Page 177)
139 UCC Rep. Serv. 990 (ND Ga. 1971).
See also, In re Nunnemaker Transporta-
tion Co., Inc., 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 468
(9th Cir. 1972).
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